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A B S T R A C T   
Marine protection is one of the main Sustainable Development Goals designed by the United Nations. Specif-
ically, Goal 6.3 – Clean Water and Sanitation – defends that the spill of dangerous and pollutant substances must 
be eliminated. This principle is inherent in Maritime law since maritime salvage concerns not only vessels and 
cargo but also the marine environment. Since the Torrey Canyon accident in 1967, spilt crude has become the 
centre of attention of the International Maritime Organization (IMO). Nowadays, IMO has extended its scope of 
application to new threats, such as pollutant gas emissions. Its last approved strategy is IMO 2020, focused on the 
reduction of sulphur emissions by vessels. It came into force on the 1st of January 2020, becoming one effective 
measure to minimize the sulphur emissions to the atmosphere and to improve the environmental conditions, not 
only at the sea but also in the coastal and inland areas.    
1. Introduction 
In the last decades, the sea has become the centre of attention of the news 
due to the damages in the maritime environment. Lately, plastic has gathered 
all this attention due to two principal reasons. The first factor refers to the 
enormous quantity of this material in the sea: more than 5.25 trillion plastic 
particles – approximately, 268,940 t (Eriksen et al., 2014) – appreciated in, 
for example, the “garbage islands” such as the Great Pacific garbage patch 
with an area of 1,6 million km2 (Lebreton et al., 2018). The second factor is 
explained by the fact that every decade there are fewer oil discharges in the 
water. From the first crude spills until the last sulphur emissions, society has 
developed an environmental concern (Pendón Meléndez and Romero Matute, 
2017), so people are more aware of maritime pollution. 
From a legal perspective, Maritime law standardises the sea and its 
aspects: from the transports to the insurances, but also the fishing and 
other activities related to the maritime sphere. Nevertheless, this envi-
ronmental concern has not become part of the Law until maritime 
salvage; especially, since the '60s. specifically, the Torrey Canyon acci-
dent supposed an inflexion point in the conception of environmental 
maritime rescue) (Pendón Meléndez and Romero Matute, 2017). Thus, 
maritime salvage has been the first in putting the environment and 
pollution in the centre. From there until now, worldwide awareness has 
been created related to the environmental protection of the seas. 
Nowadays, new strategies are being developed and created for the 
protection of the sea. Among them, it should be outlined the last one 
which came into force on the 1st of January of 2020. The International 
Maritime Organization (IMO)1 approved the “IMO 2020”, which is 
based on the reduction of the sulphur emissions from the vessels. 
2. Origins of the environmental concern and the first response: 
maritime salvage 
From the beginning of the 20th century, crude began to be used for the 
propulsion of vessels. This substance replaced coal for this purpose (Louzán 
Lago, 2012). Lately, World War II promoted a technological development 
that influenced, among other aspects, the creation of modern and improved 
vessels. The consumption of crude and other chemical substances increased 
during that century. Consequently, there was a significant rise in the 
commerce and transport of those dangerous substances (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2018). 
E-mail address: paula.siezi@alum.uca.es.   
1 The International Maritime Organization (IMO) was created to regulate maritime safety in the international sphere. It is a specialized agency of the United 
Nations with the faculty of developing international conventions for the protection of the sea. One of the most relevant of these conventions is the SOLAS Convention 
(Safety of Life at Sea Convention) which was adopted in 1914 after the Titanic incident. 
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When any one of those vessels had an accident, it had serious envi-
ronmental consequences.2 Nevertheless, until 1960 neither the organi-
zations nor the society cared so much about them.3 The environmental 
concern developed some years later. 
The first maritime accident which is usually cited is the Torrey Canyon in 
1967. This vessel ran aground in the western coast of Cornwall in 1967; its 
cargo capacity was 120,890 t of crude oil. Approximately, 30,000 t were 
spilt into the sea and 100 miles of coastline were affected. Later, due to bad 
weather and strong winds, the vessel broke her back and it caused another 
spillage of 30,000 t (Comité Maritime International, 2003). Some days after 
that, the British Naval and Air Forces bombed the vessel to set fire to the 
vessel and limit the disaster. Nevertheless, this strategy caused more 
damages than benefits, especially in marine biodiversity. This accident 
showed that, generally, the governments or the authorities had not had any 
procedures to follow on those occasions. For that reason and due to its 
serious environmental consequences too, this accident marked a turning 
point for maritime salvage and, eventually, for environmental protection. 
To begin, the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(IMCO) – from 1982 called International Maritime Organization (IMO)4 – 
decided to revise the OILPOL 1964/62 Convention.5 At the same time, the 
media covered the Torrey Canyon accident, allowing society to start being 
conscious of this and other disasters. On the other hand, the international 
sphere reacted creating, among other aspects, the International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Funds (IOPC Funds). The IOPC Funds were 
created to compensate the victims of the oil pollution accidents.6 
Unfortunately, that was not the only grave accident at the sea.7 Five 
years later of the Torrey Canyon, the vessel Sea Star provoked a spill in 
the Oman Gulf of 115,000 t of crude oil. Three years later, the Jakob 
Maersk, charged with oil from Iran wrecked ashore in the port of Leixoes 
(Portugal).8 Only a year later, in 1976, a new spill hit the Spanish 
shoreline: the oil tanker Urquiola, with a cargo of more than a hundred 
thousand of crude, wrecked causing serious damages in the coast of 
Ferrol, Ares and La Coruña. In 1978, it happened the gravest maritime 
accident in Europe with a spill of, approximately, 223,000 t of crude 
(Kifrier, 1978): the oil tanker Amoco Cádiz had grounded at Portsall Bay 
(France). The vessel suffered a power failure and the rudder did not 
respond nor could be repaired. Finally, the ship drifted into the rocks 
and it broke apart. This accident showed what could happen when a 
“giant” tanker could spill its cargo. 
Despite the mentioned accidents above, in 1979 the hugest maritime 
accident happened: the Atlantic Empress wrecked causing a spill of 
almost 300,000 t of crude on the coast of Tobago. This VLCC9 crashed 
with another vessel, the Aegean Captain, on the 19th of July of 1979 
(Hooke, 1997).10 
Taking into consideration those incidents, different actors of the 
maritime sphere11 point out the incapacity to establish a new adaptable 
legal regime to the changes at the end of the 20th century12; especially 
about not only the technical novelties that allowed to develop vessels for 
the transport of dangerous substances or its cargo capacity but also the 
consequences in maritime accidents. The environmental concern was 
developing not only in society but also in international institutions. One 
of IMO's responsibilities is “Implementation, Control and Coordination”; 
2 Ship accidents are not the only source of serious maritime pollution. Prior to 
the entry into force of the 1989 International Convention on Maritime Salvage, 
the largest oil spill at sea occurred in 1979, with the puncture at an exploratory 
oil well – Ixtoc-1 – in the Gulf of Mexico. Approximately 480,000 tons of oil 
were released over a period of 10 months (Burgherr, 2007). Subsequently, in 
2010, the Deepwater Horizon, an oil platform located in the same Gulf, sank 
producing a spill of some 779,000 t of crude oil (Beyer et al., 2016).  
3 For example, the accident that involved The E.H. Blum at the East coast of 
the United States. The E.H. Blum was the biggest oil tanker in its period with a 
cargo of 11,600 t. From this accident it is relevant the fact that was widely 
cover by the media, for example, in this article of The New York Times, of the 
19th of February 1942: https://www.nytimes.com/1942/02/19/archives/ 
tanker-wrecked-off-us-east-coast-by-mines-or-uboat-the-eh-blum-one.html. 
Nevertheless, that apparition in the news was very local and cause, generally, 
no effect in the international sphere or the global society.  
4 In 1982, this organization became the International Maritime Organization, 
leaving behind the term “consultative”.  
5 The OILPOL 1954/62 Convention was approved before the Torrey Canyon 
incident in 1967 to prevent pollution of the sea by oil discharged from ships. 
However, the efforts made in this Convention did not collaborate in the pre-
vention of that accident or its consequences. The original text of the OILPOL 
Convention was approved in 1954; later, it was updated in 1962 (OILPOL 62), 
1969 (OILPOL 69), and 1971 (OILPOL 71). Finally, the OILPOL Convention 
was subsumed by the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL Convention) in 1973.The MARPOL Convention has been 
the result of several years of efforts from different nations with maritime 
tradition. Thus, the first national legislation for the prevention of pollution at 
the sea was the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, of the United Kingdom in 1922. 
Two years later, the United States —which was then the first country in the 
production of oil— enacted the Oil Pollution Act which forbids any discharge 
of any type of hydrocarbons within its three nautical miles of territorial waters. 
Later, this country was the host of the Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters, an 
international conference about the oil pollution control at sea. This conference 
took place in the United States from the 8th to the 16th of June of 1926. The 
main maritime countries were invited to it accompanied by its experts in the 
field. During the conference, the host, along with the United Kingdom, 
convinced other attendee countries to agree to some pollution control zones up 
to 50 nautical miles from the nearest shoreline. Indeed, in some special loca-
tions, this zone will be expanded until 150 nautical miles. After World War II, 
the crude transport from the Middle East increased considerably; therefore, so 
did crude spills. In this context, the United Kingdom organized a second in-
ternational conference in 1954 where it was adopted the OILPOL (International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil) (Louzán Lago, 
2012). 
6 Its legal framework was the 1969 International Convention on Civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 Civil Liability Convention) and, later, the 
1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Compensation for Oil Pollution (1971 Fund Convention). Nowadays, these 
funds still exist; they are formed by two intergovernmental organizations: the 
1992 Fund and the Supplementary Fund. Its work is to facilitate the compen-
sations for the damages produced by crude spills and maritime accidents. For 
more information, its webpage can be consulted: https://www.iopcfunds. 
org/es/.  
7 Fourteen of the twenty maritime accidents with more spill from 1967 
(Torrey Canyon) happened before the International Convention on Salvage of 
1989 came into force. For further information, it can be consulted the Oil tanker 
spills Statistics 2019 report by ITOPF (International Tanker Owners Pollution 
Federation Limited) in https://www.itopf.org/knowledge-resources/data- 
statistics/. ITOPF is a not-for-profit organization which assists maritime ac-
tors in the response to pollution accidents with crude: http://www.itopf.org/.  
8 After the running aground, it was an explosion in the engine room; the fire 
in the vessel provoked that the oil tanker broke in three parts. Even though two 
of them sunk, the prow kept afloat until she arrived at the land. Half of the 
88,000 t that was carrying that oil tanker burnt, causing pollution not only in 
the water but also in the air. Part of the remaining crude spilt into the water; the 
other part arrived at the shore (Duerden, 1976).  
9 Very Large Crude Carrier: it has capacity for 250,000 DWT (deadweight 
tonnes).  
10 For further information, it may be consulted the ITOPF webpage about this 
incident: https://www.itopf.org/in-action/case-studies/case-study/atlantic- 
empress-west-indies-1979/.  
11 Those actors are not only salvors but also P&I Clubs and insurances. In this 
process also collaborated some local governments and lobbies not specially 
related to the maritime field but with other interests such as environmental 
protection (Darling and Smith, 1991; Miller, 1981).  
12 Furthermore, LOF 80 – LOF or Lloyd's Open Form – already began to adapt 
this reality with the safety net, as it will be explained in infra 3.2.1. LOF 80 and 
the safety net. Notwithstanding that it will be developed later, LOF is a salvage 
contract form designed by Lloyd's. Its version of 1980 was quite relevant 
because it introduced a new concept for salvage: “the safety net” which, for the 
first time, allowed salvors to recover its expenses (and a little margin of benefit) 
if they had assisted an oil tanker. 
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therefore, this organization must detect any problems that could affect 
the maritime sphere, adopt legislation in consequence and then, Gov-
ernments will be responsible for implementing them. The environment 
became a central element in salvage since it was impossible to conceive 
maritime salvage ignoring the protection of the marine resources. 
Among other aspects, a new legal concept became to be necessary. 
For that reason, the Legal Committee of the IMO requested the Comité 
Maritime International (CMI)13 to examine the principles of Private law 
about maritime salvage. Maritime salvage is a Private law institution that 
consists of the assistance of a vessel or cargo in peril at the sea. In the in-
ternational sphere, it was first regulated by the Brussels Convention on 
Assistance and Salvage at Sea of 1910. This Convention had only 19 articles 
and it was quite simple. Nevertheless, it regulated for the first time some 
basic principles of maritime salvage which gave the text recognition and 
success. Among other aspects, it considered the basic elements for salvage: 
the assistance, the object of salvage, the peril, the success and the award. 
Related to the success, the International Convention of 1910 established 
this element as necessary to consider an operation maritime salvage. Thus, 
the Convention regulated the basic principle of salvage: no cure-no pay. 
The principle no cure-no pay established that salvors are entitled to 
receive a reward when they achieve total o partial success in a maritime 
salvage operation. This principle was defined in the case The Fusilia,14 
“where no property has been salved, and life alone had been preserved 
from destruction, not suit for salvage reward could be maintained”. In 
this way, the success, or “requirement of success” (Shaw, 1996), is 
formed by two elements. The first is the success, strictly speaking, which 
means that the salvors must recover any element with economic utility. 
The success of the operation may be total or partial.15 Thus, the assis-
tance is complete when the economic value of the salved object is higher 
than what could have been lost if salvage had been not rendered (Le 
Clère, 1954). The second element is the beneficial service and consists of 
the causal link between the salvage operation and the salved values. The 
beneficial service requires that the operation of salvage contributes to 
achieving success. In this way, the salvor must participate in the oper-
ation that rescues the objects from the peril and assistance the vessel or 
its cargo. In conclusion, success is achieved when salvors save the 
property to its owner. If the salvors did not complete the salvage oper-
ation or they left the vessel in a worse or more dangerous condition than 
before, they will not have the right to recover an award.16 
On the contrary, there is an exception to the principle no cure-no pay, 
which is called “engaged services” or “services at the request”.17 If the 
object of the salvage contract consists of the render of salvage services, it 
will be fulfilled if the salvors performance those services. For example, in 
The Undaunted,18 the vessel lost its anchor due to the strong winds. A 
merchant's vessel went to lend some service to the ship in peril. Thus, she 
was commanded to find the lost anchor. In the meantime, The Undaunted 
reach its safety. In this case, the tribunal gives an award to the crew and 
captain of the merchant's vessel even though their services did not 
collaborate in helping the vessel in peril. 
Following these engaged services, other countries, such as Italy, have 
promoted salvors' remuneration even though they have not achieved 
any success.19 In this way, success is not a necessary element for salvage; 
salvors would recover a reward for their expenses. Additionally, if they 
achieve success in their operation, they are entitled to receive an award 
(Volli, 1957). 
Traditionally, the principle no cure-no pay was enough to motivate 
salvors to perform maritime salvage operations. Despite the risk suffered 
by the salvors, the award was enough to pay salvors' expenses and a rise 
for the risk in the operation. Nevertheless, in the cases when there is not 
property to save or the salvors have not achieved any (economic) suc-
cess, they did not have the right to obtain a reward. 
From the ‘60s this principle, until then, the basis of maritime salvage, 
began to show its inadequacy in some cases which can be explained by 
two factors. First, 10 years before, the number of vessels of the global 
fleet had grown about 136% and the gross tonnage, around 382% 
(Coulthard, 1983). Nevertheless, this growth was not reflected in the 
salvors’ awards. This is always limited by the value of the salvage 
property (Article 2 of the 1910 Convention and, later, Article 13.3 of the 
1989 Convention). Even though generally, the value of the vessels had 
increased due to the novelties in technology and security, when a vessel 
had an accident, the reparation cost may be higher than the repaired 
ship. Taking that into consideration, in some cases, shipowners 
preferred to declare total loss (Coulthard, 1983) than repairing the 
vessel. Consequently, if, eventually, there was not salved property, sal-
vors could not receive any award. The second factor is the fact that 
maritime accidents with serious environmental consequences, were 
progressively more frequent. Thus, coastal states and society, in general, 
were more aware of this situation and considered it necessary to repair 
de damage. 
As time has gone by, the 1910 Brussels Convention began to show its 
inadequacy for the demands of the new industry of salvage.20 As it has 
been exposed, the maritime accidents from the ‘60s needed a modern 
regulation for the protection of the maritime environment. After the 
Atlantic Empress accident, the CMI created a specific subcommittee to 
study the maritime salvage and, additionally, to write a draft of a new 
13 This non-governmental and not-for-profit international organization was 
established in Antwerp in 1897. Thus, it is the oldest organization that exclu-
sively concerns the unification of Maritime law and its practices (Frawley, 
2004). Its actual main objective continues to be contributing by all appropriate 
means and activities to the unification of Maritime law. For further information, 
its webpage can be consulted: https://comitemaritime.org/.  
14 (1865) Brown & Lush 345 (1865) 167 ER 391.  
15 The Tojo Maru, 1972, A.C., 242–293.  
16 Owners of S.S. Melanie v. Owners of S.S. San Onofre [1925] A.C. 246–262.  
17 Previously and despite the weight of the no cure-no pay principle, salvors 
could obtain a reward even though they had not achieved any success in the 
maritime salvage. Exceptionally, they could receive a reward from a national 
fund such as the Mercantile Marine Fund in the United Kingdom ex article 
554.3 of the Merchant Shipping Act of 1894, related with the life maritime 
salvage: “Where the vessel, cargo, and apparel are destroyed, or the value 
thereof is insufficient, after payment of the actual expenses incurred, to pay the 
amount of salvage payable in respect of the preservation of life, the Board of 
Trade may, in their discretion, award to the salvor, out of the Mercantile Marine 
Fund, such sum as they think fit in whole or part satisfaction of any amount of 
salvage so left unpaid». Thus, life salvage was more dependent on the “tradi-
tional” salvage —based on the no cure-no pay principle— than the “environ-
mental salvage” (Chen, 2001). 
18 (1860) Lush. 90 at 92.  
19 This is established in articles 491 and 492 of the Codice della navigazione of 
1942. The first one is related to the maritime salvage of a vessel or an aircraft: 
“l'assistenza e il salvataggio di nave o di aeromobile, che non siano effettuati contro il 
rifiuto espresso e ragionevole del comandante, danno diritto, entro i limiti del valore 
dei beni assistiti o salvati, al risarcimento dei danni subiti e al rimborso delle spese 
incontrate, nonché, ove abbiano conseguito un risultato anche parzialmente utile, a 
un compenso (…)”. Article 492 of this Codice is related to maritime salvage of 
cargo: “il salvataggio di cose, che Non sia effettuato contro il rifiuto espresso e 
ragionevole del comandante della nave o dell'aeromobile in pericolo o del proprie-
tario delle cose, dà diritto, nei limiti stabiliti nell'articolo precedente, al risarcimento 
dei danni, al rimborso delle spese, nonché, ove abbia conseguito un risultato anche 
parzialmente utile, a un compenso determinato a norma del predetto articolo”. For 
more information, vid. RIGHETTI, Trattato di Diritto Marittimo, Milán, 1994, p. 
649. Those articles of the Codice as this italian doctrine bases the critics to the 
adoption of the International Convention on Salvage of 1989 (Celle, 2010). 
20 This Convention had some modifications to adapt itself to the new condi-
tions of the navigation; for example, the progress from the steamboat to the 
propulsion engine since it meant that vessels could carry its fuel. In those cases 
where the vessel had an accident and the hull broke, the crude could spill; 
therefore, there would be a crude spill with all its environmental consequences. 
Nevertheless, it became insufficient to the environmental concern which had 
already begun developing. 
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international convention to regulate the maritime salvage which would 
be given to the IMO for its exam. At the same time, the company Lloyd's 
developed its own solution to protect the environment in maritime 
salvage with the approval of LOF 80.21 
The CMI also organized the XXXII International Conference of the 
CMI22 held in Montreal on the 24th–29th of May of 1981. In this con-
ference, the CMI purposed the draft to the IMO (Darling and Smith, 1991). 
The CMI draft not only adapted the general rules of the maritime salvage 
but also introduced new previsions to motivate the saviour with the final 
purpose to protect the maritime environment in their services.23 
Despite the first movements towards a new legal regime of maritime 
salvage, in the ‘80s occurred six of the twenty biggest maritime acci-
dents.24 In 1982 the Castillo de Bellver spilt more than 252,000 t of 
crude, becoming the third accident with the biggest spill.25 In 1983, 
when the mentioned subcommittee was working on the revision of the 
1910 Convention on Salvage, the IMO declared that maritime salvage 
should be a priority in the following two years. Moreover, it was ar-
ranged that the research of this topic by the IMO should have as a 
foundation the study made by the CMI.26 The Legal Committee of the 
IMO analysed every article of the CMI draft, concluding with the first 
version of the draft during its fifty-third session.27 Linked with these 
ship accidents, there was a legislative process to solve past errors and 
face the future with better preparation. Many normative advances had 
been achieved better environmental maritime security. It can be 
highlighted, maybe due to its relevance and international origin, the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL).28  
Nevertheless, something else was necessary. Thus, the IMO in 1984, 
held two international conferences where two protocols were approved: 
first, the Protocol to Amend the International Convention on Civil Lia-
bility for Oil Pollution Damage of 198429 and, second, the International 
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), later 
replaced by the one approved in 1992.30 Finally, in 1989, between the 
17th and the 18th of April was held the International Conference on 
Salvage (Comité Maritime International, 2003). In this conference, the 
text was finally approved, adopting the new International Convention, 
named “International Convention on Salvage” concluded in London on 
the 28th of April 1989. 
2.1. LOF 80 and the safety net 
Although a contract is not mandatory to perform a salvage operation, 
most salvage operations are rendered based on an agreement between 
the parties (Brice, 2011). Parties in the contract may opt for any of the 
different standard contracts used in the practice. There exist several 
forms of salvage agreements. Among others, Le Contrat d'Assistance 
Maritime, from France; the TOF – Turkish Maritime Organization Salvage 
and Assistance Agreement – from Turkey; the MARSALV – U.S. Navy 
Salvage Agreement – from the United States, the JSE – Japanese Shipping 
Exchange Salvage Agreement – or the Standard Form of the Maritime 
Arbitration Commission, designed by China. Notwithstanding the cir-
cumstances that influence the parties to use any of those models,31 
Lloyd's Open Form of Salvage Agreement, known simply as “LOF” and 
designed by Lloyd's32 is the most extended and relevant one. 
In the XIXth century, salvors began to use some contracts for their 
performance of salvage operations. The most distinguished were the 
ones designed by Lloyd's. Its first form was published in 1892 named 
Lloyd's Standard Form of Salvage Agreement – No cure-No pay.33 In 1908 it 
was decided that Lloyd's form should be the only one employed in 
maritime salvage contracts (Thomas, 1978). LOF became an instrument 
that regulated the salvage operation between the contractor and the 
owner of the vessel or property. Its main objective was to salvage the 
property; therefore, there is no reference to life salvage. Since its version 
of 1908, some characteristics of Lloyd's have been maintained, such as 
the determination of the price by an arbitrator (Petrinović et al., 2013). 
21 This contract will be considered infra 3.1 LOF 80 and the safety net.  
22 This conference was held in the Bonaventure Hotel in Montreal from the 
24th to the 29th of May. In the agenda it was planned the revision of the 
Brussels Convention of 1910; moreover, it was expected to examine the re-
sponsibility of the shipper about hazardous and dangerous cargo. IMO's web-
page counts on some interesting documents as the files of this conference: 
https://comitemaritime.org/publications-documents/documents-of-interest/.  
23 This pollution risk was expected not only from the spills of the transport of 
crude but also from any possible failure of the vessels (Gaskell, 1986).  
24 Starting with the Irenes Serenade which provoked a spill of 94,000 t of 
crude at the Navarino Bay (Greece) after some explosions in the forecastle of 
the vessel. ITOPF's webpage counts on a summary of this accident: 
https://www.itopf.org/in-action/case-studies/case-study/irenes-serenade- 
greece-1980/. Also, the doctrine has pronounced about it (Hooke, 1997). More 
accidents happened in the previous years of the approval of the Convention OF 
1989. Among others, there should be pointed out the Nova, the Odyssey, the 
Khark 5, the Exxon Valdez and the Christos Bitas; which in its travel from 
Rotterdam to Belfast, spilt more than 4000 t of crude in 1978 (Bourne, 1979).  
25 The Castillo de Bellver burnt the 6th of August of 1983. Despite its huge 
spill of crude, damages to the marine environment were not as serious as others 
as the Amoco Cádiz (Moldan et al., 1985; Wardley-Smith, 1983). It must be 
considered that in maritime accidents it is not only relevant the amount of 
cargo spilt, but also what type of cargo is it, the meteorological characteristics, 
the capacity and the speed of the authorities' intervention, etc.  
26 Report of the Legal Committee of the work of its 50th session, Document 
LEG 50/8.ou  
27 Report of the Legal Committee of the work of its 53rd session, Document 
LEG 53/8. 
28 This International Convention is the most important regarding the pre-
vention of pollution of the marine environment by vessels. It was adopted in 
1973 and it has been amended later by different protocols to keep it up to date. 
The Convention is divided into six technical Annexes which develop different 
special aspects of pollution prevention. 
29 Later replaced by the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (FUND) of 1992. 




30 IMO's webpage of this convention can be consulted in http://www.imo.org/ 
es/about/conventions/listofconventions/paginas/international-convention- 
on-civil-liability-for-oil-pollution-damage-(clc).aspx.  
31 For example, the enormous weight of the carriage of goods in China, the 
relevant commerce in the English Channel or the importance of the Strait of 
Istanbul may explain the creation of the Chinese, French and Turkish standard 
contracts of salvage. 
32 Lloyd's is a business empire based on a concentration of specialist under-
writing experts which more than fifty leading insurance companies, 200 
registered Lloyd's brokers and a global network of over 4000 local coverholders. 
They can be considered as a unique insurance market which brings together 
syndicates and underwrites companies and programmes. Its web page can be 
consulted in https://www.lloyds.com/.  
33 This form was designed by Sir Henry Hozier, Lloyd's secretary, (Petrinović 
et al., 2013) for a salvor operating in The Dardanelles (Miller, 1981). It was 
later revised in 1896, 1897 and 1908 before being officially published (Ken-
nedy, 2010). 
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Nowadays this form is known as Lloyd's Open Form34 or, simply, as LOF. 
Its last version is LOF 2020.35 
LOF 80 is one of the past versions of this contract and it was quite 
relevant due to the incorporation of the safety net. Before LOF 80, this 
contract form – or any other standard form of salvage – exclusively 
established the principle no cure-no pay for the earning of a salvage 
remuneration. Principle no cure-no pay considers that if the salvor does 
not achieve any result or success in the salvage operation, he or she has 
no right to earn any remuneration, neither a reward for their expenses. 
Under this principle, the salvor needs to succeed in the recovery of the 
property in peril to get paid. 
Nevertheless, sometimes accidents happen. A vessel may get sunk or 
get damaged because of different factors during the navigation: bad 
weather, heavy winds, dysfunction of its equipment or machinery, etc. 
Additionally, in a maritime accident where mainly crude but also any 
other pollutant substances are the cargo, they could provoke damages to 
the maritime environment. Under these circumstances, the principle no 
cure-no pay generally would not offer any reward for the salvors. The 
vessel may be recovered but, in general, there is no success in recovering 
the cargo since it is completely damaged. For that reason, when there 
was a salvage operation to protect the environment, salvors were not 
used to receiving any reward for their service. In this way, there were no 
economic incentives for the salvors to risk their lives and to perform an 
“environmental salvage”. Thus, no cure-no pay principle became 
insufficient to confront the problems that emerged in maritime salvage 
(Chen, 2001). 
After the Amoco Cádiz incident in 1978 and the Christos Bitas in the 
same year, Lloyd's Committee decided to revise the LOF 1972 – current 
at that moment. From this meeting, the Committee designed a new 
proposal based on two principal aspects (Bessemer Clark, 1980; de la 
Rue and Anderson, 2012; Jarvis, 1985). The first one, salvors must 
protect the environment in their performance of a salvage operation. As 
compensation, they will receive a special remuneration for their ser-
vices. The second aspect will deal with the creation of a specific fund 
(Pollution Fund) for oil tankers. This fund will pay the salvor a 
compensation if he or she would have prevented, minimized or 
controlled the pollution from those vessels. 
Considering that, LOF 80 introduced a new concept: the safety net.36 
For the first time, LOF 80 was the first standard contract creating an 
“exception” to the no cure-no pay principle (Gold, 1989), which was 
considered insufficient for the salvors who assist an oil tanker (Tsimplis, 
2018). This safety net will apply in those cases where an oil tanker37 
would have suffered an accident and salvors would have prevented the 
spill of the cargo,38 whenever the salved property was insufficient to pay 
the expenses of the salvor. Additionally, they could receive an increase 
of up to 15% of their expenses if they would have protected the envi-
ronment. This last compensation was known as enhancement reward 
(Kerr, 1989). Thus, the business world was the first in being sensitive 
about “maritime salvage” or, at least, about the marine environment and 
its protection. It was so relevant that, some years later, the international 
organizations – such as CMI and IMO – took this contract as a reference 
to design the special compensation in the International Convention on 
Salvage of 1989. 
2.2. The special compensation of Article 14 of the 1989 Convention 
The International Convention on Salvage came into force on the 
14th of July of 1996 after the ratifying of 15 countries. After the 
maritime accidents happened in the 20th century, this new convention 
allowed to adapt the salvage industry to modern times.39 Consequently, 
the Convention of 1989 adapts the previous one of 1910, not only 
taking advantage of the experience of almost 80 years (Pendón 
Meléndez and Romero Matute, 2017) but also leaving a mark on the 
environmental concern in the maritime sphere. For example, since 
1970, spills of crude have been decreasing not only in quantity (tonnes) 
but also in accidents. Meanwhile in the 70's the average of spills was 
78,800 t, in the last decade of 2000–2010, this has been reduced to 
18,100 t. Nowadays, from 2010 this number is, approximately, 6400 t 
of crude. Accident numbers have also decreased. For example, in the 
'70s there were around 250 incidents. Between 2010 and 2018, there 
only have been seventeen maritime accidents (Oil Tanker Spill Statistics 
2019, 2020). 
The biggest incorporation of the 1989 Convention is contained in 
Article 14: the special compensation.40 LOF 80 was the inspiration for 
this article (Brice, 2011).41 However, before the International Conven-
tion on Salvage was approved, another event took place: the Montreal 
Conference was celebrated in 1981. In this conference, the safety net was 
planned to be extended to every vessel (Shaw, 1996) – since the LOF 80 
was only applicable to oil tankers. Besides, the percentage of LOF 80 
(15%) was designed to increase up to 100%. These two measures were 
known as the “Montreal compromise” (Brice, 1990; Shaw, 1996). Some 
years later, in the Diplomatic Conference which was held in London in 
34 The term “open” refers to the quantity of the remuneration as a flexible 
aspect. Moreover, it allows that the referee or tribunal can determine it (Gas-
kell, 1986). 
35 Lloyd's has published different versions of LOF in previous years, specif-
ically in 1896, 1897, 1908, 1924, 1926, 1950, 1953, 1967, 1972, 1980, 1990, 
1995, 2000 and 2011.  
36 The clause 1 (a) of LOF 80 established that: “The Contractor agrees to use 
his best endeavours to salve the and/or her cargo bunkers and stores and take 
them to (see note 3) or other place to be hereafter agreed or if no place is named 
or agreed to a place of safety. The Contractor further agrees to use his best 
endeavours to prevent the escape of oil from the vessel while performing the 
services of salving the subject vessel and/or her cargo bunkers and stores. The 
services shall be rendered and accepted as salvage services upon the principle of 
‘no cure—no pay’ except that where the property being salved is a tanker laden 
or partly laden with a cargo of oil and without negligence on the part of the 
Contractor and/or his Servants and/or Agents (1) the services are not successful 
or (2) are only partially successful or (3) the Contractor is prevented from 
completing the services the Contractor shall nevertheless be awarded solely 
against the Owners of such tanker his reasonably incurred expenses and an 
increment not exceeding 15% of such expenses but only if and to the extent that 
such expenses together with the increment are greater than any amount 
otherwise recoverable under this Agreement. Within the meaning of the said 
exception to the principle of ‘no cure—no pay’ expenses shall in addition to 
actual out of pocket expenses include a fair rate for all tugs craft personnel and 
other equipment used by the Contractor in the services and oil shall mean crude 
oil fuel oil heavy diesel oil and lubricating oil”. 
37 Its application exclusively to oil tankers has provoked a rejection in the 
doctrine since there are other dangerous toxins in any vessel that affect the 
maritime environment. This was, unfortunately, demonstrated in the accident 
of El Paso Paul Kayser, an LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas Carrier) in 1979 which 
grounded in Algeciras' Bay (Gold, 1989; Jar Torres, 2018). Nevertheless, there 
should not be underrated the LOF 80 criteria because it established a precedent 
that will be later copied by international organizations.  
38 Clause 1 (a) of LOF 80 considers exclusively the prevention of the pollution. 
However, it does not establish anything about the contention or minimization 
of the pollution caused by the oil tanker.  
39 Apart from the exception of article 6.3, the 1989 Convention maintains the 
principles of the previous Convention of Brussels of 1910 (Brice, 2011). The 
objective of the International Convention on Salvage of 1989 is again shown: 
the protection of the maritime environment.  
40 This term was coined for what the doctrine had been calling “environmental 
salvage” (Pendón Meléndez and Romero Matute, 2017) (Mandaraka-Sheppard, 
2013) (Chen, 2001).  
41 LOF 80 includes in its terms – 1 (a) Clause – the no cure-no pay principle 
except for those situations when the salved cargo came from an oil tanker or a 
tanker laden. For this exception to apply, it is necessary to fulfil some cir-
cumstances: there must not be “negligence on the part of the Contractor and/or 
his Servants and/or Agents (1) the services are not successful or (2) are only 
partially successful or (3) the Contractor is prevented from completing the 
services”. 
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1989 it was reached a more ambitious objective: the redaction of Article 
14 of the International Convention on Salvage; known as the “London 
compromise”, and eventually, as the special compensation.42 
The special compensation of the 1989 Convention applies to every 
vessel which by itself or its cargo threatened damage to the environ-
ment. It should not be understood as an award but as a compensation for 
the out of pocket expenses43 that the salvor has incurred to perform the 
salvage (Mandaraka-Sheppard, 2013).44 Additionally, when salvor 
would have prevented or minimized the damage to the environment, the 
special compensation may be increased up to a maximum of 30% of the 
expenses incurred by the salvor. Moreover, if the tribunal – arbitral or 
jurisdictional – considers it fair and just to do so, it may increase the 
special compensation further, but up to a maximum of 100% of the 
expenses incurred by the salvor. 
To summarize, four requirements could be pointed out for the 
application of Article 14 of 1989: first, a salvage operation must be 
rendered to a vessel which by itself or by its cargo consists of a threat to 
the environment45 (Article 14.1). Second, salvors had to have pre-
vented or minimized the damage to the environment. Third, the 
tribunal would be discretional to decision about what percentage in-
creases the salvors' compensation (Kennedy, 2010). Fourth and last, the 
special compensation will only be paid when the regular compensation 
– Article 13 – would be inferior. As a result, this special compensation 
motivates those salvors to perform salvage operations to any vessel 
with dangerous or pollutant cargo and not only oil tankers (Darling and 
Smith, 1991). 
According to Article 6.1 of the 1989 Convention, the parties of the 
salvage contract can make an exception to the no cure-no pay principle; 
they can also establish another form to calculate salvors' compensation. 
Nevertheless, the protection of the maritime environment is an imper-
ative aspect for the parties. Thus, Article 6.3 of the 1989 Convention 
considers that under no circumstances, parties cannot avoid their duties 
to prevent or minimize damage to the environment. 
2.3. SCOPIC clause 
The origin of the Special Compensation P&I Club clause or SCOPIC 
clause is the judicial resolution of the case The Nagasaki Spirit46 adopted 
by the House of Lords47 in 1997. In this case, the tribunal considered 
that the salvors must receive the special compensation, based on Article 
14.2 of the International Convention on Salvage of the 65% of their out 
of pocket expenses. It was the first judicial decision that pronounced 
about the special compensation of Article 14 (Bonaisses, 1995). Not only 
salvors (International Salvage Union) but also other actors in the salvage 
industry such as the International Chamber of Shipping, London assur-
ances, P&I Clubs (Wetterstein, 1999) felt, generally, disappointed by the 
result of this case (Hodges and Hill, 2001). 
Consequently, the mentioned actors above met in autumn of 1997 to 
create a new proceeding; they expected it to be simpler than the special 
compensation described in Article 14 of the 1989 Convention. There-
fore, it was due to a business initiative that maritime salvage – and, 
especially, environmental salvage – evolved to better protection of the 
maritime environment and salvors' rights. The result was the SCOPIC 
Clause in august of 1999 (Kennedy, 2010). This alternative system 
allowed the P&I Clubs to have some control of the payment to the ser-
vices rendered (Browne, 1999). It was finished a year later, entering into 
force simultaneously with LOF 2000 (Kennedy, 2010). The SCOPIC 
Clause can be defined as a particular clause – even though because of its 
length has sometimes been considered as an independent “contract” – 
which establishes the specific proceeding and award of a precise salvage 
operation (especially for but not only, environmental salvage). It can be 
considered as a huge development in maritime salvage, and it is ex-
pected to be used or incorporated into a LOF contract. 
SCOPIC Clause gives both parts of the contracts some advantages: the 
salvor does not have to prove the threat to the environment. On the 
other hand, the remuneration is rated and detailed in Annex A with the 
prediction that the salvor could earn a remuneration with an increase of 
25%. Nevertheless, if the parties decide to apply SCOPIC, the remu-
neration of the contract will be based on this clause, but not in Articles 
13 or 14 of the International Convention on Salvage. 
SCOPIC clause can be incorporated into LOF 2020. Lloyd's form es-
tablishes in its box number 7 the following question and the possibility 
to answer: “Is the Scopic Clause incorporated into this agreement? State 
alternative: Yes/No”. Besides, Clause C of LOF 2020 indicates that 
“Unless the word ‘No’ in Box 7 has been deleted this agreement shall be 
deemed to have been made on the basis that the Scopic Clause is not 
incorporated and forms no part of this agreement. If the word ‘No’ is 
deleted in Box 7 this shall not of itself be construed as a notice invoking 
the Scopic Clause within the meaning of sub-clause 2 thereof”. There-
fore, it is necessary to follow what sub-clause 2 of SCOPIC Clause in-
dicates; that is: “The Contractor shall have the option to invoke by 
written notice to the owners of the vessel the SCOPIC clause set out 
hereafter at any time of his choosing regardless of the circumstances 
and, in particular, regardless of whether or not there is a ‘threat of 










2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019
Tonnes of pollutant substances salved
Fig. 1. Number of potential pollutant substances saved by the International 
Salvage Union (ISU) (The International Salvage Union (ISU) is an association 
formed by fifty-five marine salvage companies from more than thirty countries 
in the world. Associated with it there are some members such as P&I Clubs, 
marine insurers, marine law firms, marine consultancies, national response 
organizations, etc. This association offers marine salvage to recover property 
and protect the marine environment. Its webpage can be consulted in htt 
ps://www.marine-salvage.com/.) expressed in tonnes (2008–2019). Own 
elaboration from data provided by the ISU. 
42 Including the “special” they pretended to bring to light that this compen-
sation distances from the traditional principle no cure-no pay, introducing a 
new concept in maritime salvage (Chen, 2001).  
43 Article 14.3 of the International Convention on Salvage establishes that 
“salvor's expenses for paragraphs 1 and 2 means the out-of-pocket expenses 
reasonably incurred by the salvor in the salvage operation and a fair rate for 
equipment and personnel actually and reasonably used in the salvage opera-
tion, taking into consideration the criteria set out in article 13, paragraph 1 (h), 
(i) and (j)”.  
44 On the other hand, salvors must achieve any result with the environment 
(Fernández-Guerra Fernández, 1993). Nevertheless, article 14.1 of the Inter-
national Convention on Salvage does not establish any success —in contrast, 
article 14.2— since it considers only two conditions to apply: to carry out any 
salvage operation in respect of a vessel which by itself or its cargo threatened 
damage to the environment, and to fail to earn a reward under article 13 at least 
equivalent to the special compensation assessable under this article 14.  
45 Thus, it is not necessarily real damage to the environment but a threat that 
is going to happen.  
46 The Nagasaki Spirit [1997] 1 Lloyds Rep 323.  
47 Previously on the Commercial Court [1995] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 44, 46–47 and, 
later the Court of Appeal [1996] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 449. 
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of the vessel must provide to the Contractor within two working days a 
bank guarantee or P&I Club letter providing security in the sum of three 
million dollars, inclusive of interest and costs. 
When SCOPIC is invoked, the special compensation of Article 14 of 
the 1989 Convention is not applicable in favour of the SCOPIC Clause. 
The award calculated by this clause is also supplementary to the 
remuneration of Article 13 of the 1989 Convention; except for those 
cases when it is lower than the award described in Article 13. Under this 
assumption, the remuneration obtained by Article 13, would have a 
reduction of 25%. 
In SCOPIC, the award is rated in Appendix A. This document reflects 
the daily tariff rate for personnel reasonably engaged on the contract 
and any necessary time in proceeding to and returning from the casu-
alty. Additionally, it could be paid 25% more of the quantity calculated. 
Shipowners are responsible for paying the special compensation and the 
SCOPIC Clause; however, in practice, P&I Clubs pay for it. 
Between 1999 and 2018, SCOPIC has been incorporated in 31% of 
the total cases where LOF was adopted (Jianping, 2018). Thanks to this 
clause, only in 2019, 2.3 million tonnes of pollution have been saved 
(Wingrove, 2020). Compared to 2011, when they salved 496,331 t of 
pollutants substances (Herbert, 2013), it implies a great step into marine 
protection (Fig. 1). 
3. Current situation of maritime salvage 
The number of maritime accidents which have provoked spills at the 
sea has been drastically reduced since the '70s. In that decade, there was 
an average of seventy-nine accidents per year. In contrast, between 2010 
and 2019 there have been only six (Oil Tanker Spill Statistics 2019, 2020), 
which implies a reduction of 92%. Similarly, the crude spill has been 
reduced since 1970 until today in a 95%: from an average of 319,500 t of 
crude per year, in 2010 there have been spilt only 16,000 (Oil Tanker 
Spill Statistics 2019, 2020). Indeed, 99,99% of this cargo, which is 
transported by the sea, arrives safely at its destiny (Oil Tanker Spill 
Statistics 2019, 2020). 
Nevertheless, maritime accidents are still a huge threat to the envi-
ronment. Some maritime routes cross the Large Maine Ecosystems.48 
This aspect, among others, carry a higher presence of the media in the 
case of a maritime accident. 
Maritime salvage is a very competitive industry. Nowadays, there 
exist around six operators who control the majority of the salvage op-
erations (Chiu et al., 2017; Chiu, 2020; Mǐso Mudrić, 2010). The Inter-
national Salvage Union has power over 90% of the salvage industry, 
although they only represent sixty salvage operators (Chiu et al., 2017; 
Mǐso Mudrić, 2010; Petrinović et al., 2013). Additionally, the salvage 
industry is declining (Brice, 2011). The reduction of maritime accidents 
is good news for the environment but worrier for this industry: its future 
is uncertain. Nowadays, the global benefit of the salvage business is 
around 100 million dollars per year (“The Future of LOF”, 2008); a lower 
quantity than the desired by salvors. 
Salvage “crisis” is also affecting the use of LOF causing a reduction in 
its usage (Hall, 2017). Nevertheless, and after more than one century of 
history, LOF is still the most used form in the world. On the contrary, this 
relevant form is facing some challenges. In the first place, technological 
progress has achieved more safety navigation, which means fewer ac-
cidents. Second, the economic crisis which began in 2008 affected the 
economy in general and the salvage industry in particular. There were 
fewer vessels in operation, which also meant a lower possibility of an 
accident or the necessity of salvors' operations. Currently, the shipping 
(and salvage) industry would probably be affected by the COVID-19 
crisis.49 Another critic received by LOF has been its excessive cost. 
Factors as the mentioned ones have influenced the use of LOF or any 
other form of salvage contract, and it is expected that in the present and 
future they will continue affecting. 
Related to “environmental salvage”, some governments have shown 
some reservations in using LOF for this type of salvage in the last de-
cades. Although LOF allows the invocation of the SCOPIC clause or the 
special compensation of Article 14 of the 1989 Convention, it is still 
based on the no cure-no pay principle. Thus, if an environmental salvage 
happens, there are doubts about obtaining an equitable remuneration 
for the salvors; especially in those cases where the risk is high and the 
value of the property is less considerable (“The Future of LOF”, 2008). 
Consequently, there has been shown the possibility to need a LOF form 
with zero tolerance for pollution. Reasons like the ones expressed above 
have influenced the reducing use of Lloyd's form (Fig. 2). 
As can be seen in the graphic, the trend is clearly in decline. There 
has been a descent of the use of Lloyd's Open Form in the salvage cases. 
Nevertheless, when the situation of danger is particularly difficult, the 
priority is clear: LOF contract is the first option (Chiu, 2020). 
4. The most recent strategy: IMO 2020 
4.1. Sulphur and the environment 







2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
LOF cases 2009-2019
Fig. 2. Number of maritime salvage operations using Lloyd's Open Form be-
tween 2009 and 2019. Own elaboration with the data available in Lloyd's. 
48 These are big zones in the oceans which span coast areas, river basins and 
estuaries up to the sea limit of the continental shelves. They are great areas 
(200.000 km2 or more) which include bathymetry, hydrography, productivity, 
and tropically dependent populations. Their resources are generally used for 
fishing, leisure activities and other benefits (Sherman, 2005). 
49 The pandemic situation has led some international maritime organizations 
and associations to propose recommendations to increase safety in maritime 
navigation, not only in the salvage industry. For example, the IMO has pub-
lished some protocols to ensure safe ship crew changes and travel during the 
Coronavirus (COVID-19): https://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/Press 
Briefings/pages/41-crew-change-protocols.aspx. Other organization that has 
cared about the modifications in the shipping industry due to COVID-19 is 
BIMCO (Baltic and International Maritime Council) which has created an entire 
webpage to publish recommendations for this specific situation: https://www. 
bimco.org/covid19. Among other aspects, it must be highlighted the Crew 
Change Clause for Time Charter Parties 2020. As it is explained by BIMCO, this 
clause is designed to give the owners the freedom to deviate for crew changes 
under the circumstances caused by the pandemic. Additionally, it provides an 
option for charterers to contribute to the crew change in recognition of the 
extraordinary cost of making a COVID-19 related crew change. More related to 
the insurance and salvage industry, P&I Clubs have also designed some stra-
tegies to make shipping safer. Specifically, the International Group has 
launched an online digital tool to assist shipowners, charterers, operators and 
other parties in the maritime sector to track country and port specific advice, 
detailing the measures being put in place in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. 
P. Sáez Álvarez                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Marine Pollution Bulletin 170 (2021) 112590
8
International Maritime Organization to protect the environment. As 
crude, sulphur is a pollutant element that causes terrible consequences 
for the environment and human health. Ocean's atmosphere is extremely 
sensitive to air pollution in chemical, climatic and physics grounds 
(Capaldo et al., 1999). Considering that, the last IMO's proposal is based 
on the reduction of sulphur emissions. 
Among the pollutant emissions related to shipping, it is possible to 
find carbon dioxide (CO2), nitrogen oxides (NOX), sulphur dioxide (SO2) 
and carbon monoxide (CO) (Matthias et al., 2010). Approximately, the 
shipping industry generates 15% of the world's nitrogen oxides (NOX), 
13% of global sulphur gas50 and 2.6% of global carbon dioxide emis-
sions. These environmental effects could be even more prejudicial in the 
coastal areas. Approximately, 20% of the emissions are discharged 
within the first 12 nautical miles (González-Cancelas et al., 2013). 
Moreover, about 70% of ship emissions occur within 400 km of land 
(Corbett et al., 1999). More than half of those emissions are produced by 
vessels of more than 500 GRT (gross register tonnage); and approxi-
mately, 45% of the emissions derive from vessels with flags in the Eu-
ropean Union (González-Cancelas et al., 2013). 
Sulphur oxides can produce several damages not only to the envi-
ronment but also to people. It is a toxic gas, affecting the breathing 
system and especially the lungs and mucosa. Every year, almost 64,000 
deaths (Corbett et al., 2016) are attributable to particular matters (PM) 
emissions since they can cause cardiovascular and lung cancer. 
Besides, its effects may get worse when sulphur dioxide – or nitrogen 
oxides (NOX) – reacts with water, oxygen and other chemicals present in 
the atmosphere (“Substance Infocard: Sulfur”, 2007; What is Acid Rain?, 
2020). Thus, it can become sulphuric acid and produce acid rain, which 
provokes negative effects on the soil, marine ecosystems, the forest, 
buildings and constructions, etc. (Singh and Agrawal, 2007). With the 
approval of IMO 2020, it is expected to save more than 570,000 pre-
mature deaths between 2020 and 2025 (“Implementation of Sulphur 
2020 Limit - Carriage Ban Adopted”, 2018). 
4.2. IMO 2020 
Maritime salvage was an inflexion point in Maritime law due to its 
response to marine protection. Since then, international organizations 
and local governments have promoted some strategies to prevent 
maritime pollution. The most recent one is the IMO 2020. This strategy 
was designed by the IMO and it is focused on the reduction of sulphur 
emissions. The main type of crude used for fuel in vessels is heavy fuel oil 
which is derivative from the waste of the crude distillation. The crude 
contains sulphur which, after the combustion in the engine of the vessel, 
reacts with oxygen creating sulphur oxides (SOX). This gas is liberated 
into the atmosphere becoming a very pollutant element. 
Before 2020, the IMO already designed some rules to limit sulphur 
emissions from the ships. Specifically, it was in 2005 when the first rules 
came into force with the Annex V and Annex VI of the MARPOL 
Convention. In this proposal, the global limit for sulphur emission from 
vessels was 4.50%.51 This measure entered into force in 2005 and it was 
revised in 2008.52 In 2012, the limit was revised and set at 3.50%. But it 
was 8 years later, in October 2016,53 when the IMO announced that the 
date when this measure will become effective would be the 1st of 
January 2020. With the beginning of 2020, this limit has been again 
reduced; nowadays it is determined at 0.50%.54 In some zones, this limit 
is stricter. Every vessel which operates outside the designed control 
zones55 must respect a limit of 0.10% of the emissions. Additionally, in 
March of 2020, another amendment of Annex VI of the MARPOL 
Convention came into force.56 This amendment established the prohi-
bition of the transport of non-compliant fuel oil used by vessels. 
As a result of the implementation of this strategy, it is expected to 
reduce approximately 75%–80% of the total SOX emissions from vessels 
(Burel et al., 2013; Sofiev et al., 2018). With this proposal, it is hoped to 
improve the atmosphere quality and obtain benefits for both humans, 
fauna and flora. For example, its implementation will reduce cardio-
vascular disease and lung cancer mortality by approximately 68% by 
2025. Moreover, it can also help reducing childhood asthma morbidity 
(Sofiev et al., 2018). 
Nevertheless, there are some disadvantages too. To begin, there has 
been an increase in low-sulphur fuel demand. Consequently, it has been 
a significant increase in the prices of this type of fuel (Muenster, 2020). 
Therefore, shipowners have started to include this increase as sur-
charges in the price of the freight. Among others,57 there can be found: 
BAF (Bunker Adjustment Factor), MFR (Marine Fuel Recovery), FAF 
(Fuel Adjustment Factor) or GFS (Global Fuel Surcharge). Another 
disadvantage is that the IMO does not have the necessary resources to 
control that every vessel fulfils this limit. Flag states are responsible for 
the sulphur emission's control. Thus, every ship must obtain a bunker 
delivery note, which will contemplate the sulphur content of the fuel oil 
used. Moreover, vessels will need an International Air Pollution Pre-
vention (IAPP) Certificate, provided by its flag state. This certificate will 
prove the information that the vessel is using fuel oil with sulphur that 
does not exceed the limit. Apart from flag states, port and coastal states 
can verify this information due to Port State Control (PSC). Finally, the 
immediate dramatic reduction of sulphur in the atmosphere could be 
prejudicial for the environment if CO2 is not already reduced, because 
SO2 is one of the elements which cools the atmosphere (Ji, 2020; Laakso 
et al., 2017). 
4.2.1. Main solutions to adapt to IMO 2020 
The scenario left by IMO 2020 has obligated the shipowners to obey 
this strategy by four principal solutions. The first one consists in to 
continue using HSFO58 and install technology to help them fulfil the 
IMO's strategy; for example, with the use of an exhaust gas cleaning 
system (EGCS), known as scrubbers. The technology used by the 
50 In Europe in 2013, these percentages were very similar: 18% of NOx 
emissions and 18% of SOx (Halff et al., 2019).  
51 All these numbers are expressed mass by mass (% m/m). 
52 In other modes of transportation, some strategies have already been adop-
ted. For example, in the US trucks' emissions were already limited using ultra- 
low-sulphur diesel at the beginning of 1990. In 1993 the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's Clean Air Act was approved and limit the sulphur content on- 
highway diesel. These limits were not only implemented in trucks but also other 
means of land transport affecting locomotive diesel fuel too (Muenster, 2020).  
53 OMI (MEPC 70). 
54 In 2010, the European Union established this limit in 0.1% for inland 
waterway vessels and ships at berth in the community ports (Directive 2005/ 
33/EC). It can be surprising that IMO had considered a wider limit; however, it 
should be considered that this organization regulates for the entire world and 
has to give the opportunity to the most laggard countries to adapt.  
55 These zones are denominated Emission Control Areas (ECAs) or Sulphur 
Emission Control Areas (SECAs). They are areas where stricter controls on 
sulphur emissions are being carried. Those are the Baltic Sea area; the North Sea 
area; the North American area (covering designated coastal areas of the United 
States and Canada); and the United States Caribbean Sea area (around Puerto 
Rico and the United States Virgin Islands). Countries bordering the Mediter-
ranean Sea are currently considering the possibility of applying to designate the 
Mediterranean Sea as one of these zones. Further information can be founded in 
http://web.unep.org/unepmap/world-environment-day-2019-%E2%80%9C 
beat-air-pollution%E2%80%9D.  
56 MEPC.305(73), Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI: Prohibition on the 
Carriage of Non-Compliant Fuel Oil for Combustion Purposes for Propulsion or 
Operation on board a ship.  
57 For example, MSC is including the BRC (Bunker Charge Mechanism) since 
the last four-month period of 2019 with a cost of annual fuel bill of two billion 
dollars; MAERSK is using the BAF fee applying since January 2019, with the 
same fuel bill as MSC; Hapag-Lloyd has been included MFR from January 2019, 
with an approximate cost of one billion dollars (Knowler, 2019).  
58 High Sulphur Fuel Oil. 
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scrubbers is very mature; nevertheless, its application in vessels is quite 
recent (International Maritime Organization, 2016). 
There exist different types of scrubbers and some are more protective 
of the environment than others. First of all, it is possible to distinguish 
between dry and wet scrubbers. The first ones use dry chemicals to clean 
the emissions before they are expelled. The second ones use, generally, 
seawater as a cleaning system. Wet systems are divided into an open 
loop, close-loop or hybrid system (open/closed). The close-loop system 
needs the storage of wastewater to be discharged in a particular facility. 
On the contrary, scrubbers with an open-loop system may discharge 
wastewater into the ocean. Therefore, open-loop systems are more 
pollutant than other systems. Indeed, some countries have already 
banned the use of the open-loop scrubbers, such as China, Singapore and 
Fujairah (Jonathan and Chestney, 2019; Smith and Jaffe, 2019). 
Scrubbers are not completely efficient, but they are close to; they can 
remove up to 99% of SOx and 98% of particulate matter from high- 
sulphur fuel (Wan et al., 2016). On the contrary, using a scrubber may 
be a double-edged sword because their technology is still recent and 
unproven (Smith and Jaffe, 2019). Installing a scrubber has another 
disadvantage: it requires space for its structure. In a vessel, every area 
count: using space for a scrubber means less space for the transport of 
goods, which is what, in the end, makes a profit in the vessel. In the case 
of close loop systems, there must be enough space too for the storage of 
wastewater. 
Besides, other questions must be considered if shipowners chose this 
option. For example, the reliability of the system (International Mari-
time Organization, 2016) and its maintenance cost. Even though this is, 
in theory, the cheapest strategy, it has a great cost. Installing a scrubber 
in a VLCC may cost between two and eight million dollars (Knowler, 
2019; Smith and Jaffe, 2019; Vis, 2018).59 Even that, it is probable that 
the short-term expenditure would be higher than the medium or large 
term. Choosing this option will allow the shipowners to continue using 
HSFO which will, generally, reduce its price over time. Another 
advantage of installing scrubbers is their international availability. Even 
though installing scrubbers was thought to be chosen by, approximately, 
15–20% of the vessels (Renshaw, 2020), this first solution has been 
adopted by, approximately, only 5% of the vessels in 2019 (Scerra, 
2019).60 
The second solution is to use another type of fuel61 as Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG). LNG is natural gas that has been cooled at − 162 ◦C 
(− 260 ◦F). This option practically reduces to zero sulphur emissions 
since LNG does not use sulphur to operate. Besides, NOX emissions are 
reduced approximately by 80%–85%, CO2 emissions are reduced by 
20%–30% and the particle matter production is very low (Burel et al., 
2013). Even though vessels that use LNG are considered to need less 
maintenance, it should be also weighed up that, generally, any of those 
vessels are more expensive than installing a scrubber – approximately 
about five million dollars more (Smith and Jaffe, 2019). Besides, vessels 
that begin to use LNG will need space to transport it. Therefore, they will 
reduce some cargo transport capacity (González-Cancelas et al., 2013). 
Another inconvenience in the use of LNG is that not only vessels will 
have to adapt, but also the ports themselves. Vessels using LNG will need 
specific structures where to provision and supply (González-Cancelas 
et al., 2013). Besides, nowadays, there is no global LNG bunker avail-
ability (International Maritime Organization, 2016). 
On the other hand, this second strategy could be one of the most 
effective since LNG can reduce up to 90% of the sulphur emissions 
(Smith and Jaffe, 2019). Nevertheless, the use of LNG also has some 
environmental disadvantages. The principal one is the methane slips 
from LNG engines. Methane's warming potential is around 21–25 times 
higher than CO2 (Burel et al., 2013; Nielsen and Stenersen, 2010). At the 
beginning of 2020, it was thought that between 15%–20% of vessels will 
switch to LNG, ammonia, biomethane, hydrogen or other bunker fuel 
alternatives (Renshaw, 2020). Nevertheless, already in 2019, only 0.6% 
of the global fleet used LNG as fuel. 
The third option that shipowners have to adapt to IMO 2020 is to 
switch to a low content sulphur fuel (LSFO).62 This option will reduce 
SOx emissions and its global availability is a great advantage too 
compared to LNG availability. On the contrary, VLSFO is generally more 
expensive than HSFO; for example, in 2019, the price per ton for HSFO 
was $420 versus $647 of MGO (Marine Gas Oil), one example of LSFO 
(Laval, 2019). The fuel cost is, approximately, 50% of the total cost of 
shipping (Laval, 2019). That is the reason why this choice is quite 
relevant. 
After 2020, the price of LSFO was expected to increase due to IMO 
2020 and maybe, in some years, its price would be more affordable for 
everyone. Therefore, it was thought that the use of scrubbers will 
facilitate the compliance of the IMO 2020 because shipowners expected 
to save much more money with this option. Nevertheless, this situation 
has turned out different. The marine fuel price has decreased since the 
beginning of the year, specifically, since the declaration of the pandemic 
situation due to COVID-19.63 For example, in January, a scrubber 
equipped in a VLCC could net approximately 25,000$ per day more than 
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Fig. 3. Evolution of VLSFO, MGO and ISO 380 prices based on the Global 20 
Ports Average (“Global 20 Ports Average”, 2020). For the elaboration of this 
graphic fuel prices have been taken into consideration every 15 days approxi-
mately, depending on the availability of the market information. 
59 This is an actual problem for some shipowners who cannot afford these 
payments, as it has been brought to light by the Filipino Shipowners Association 
(Liang, 2019). However, this price is relative. For example, since 2013 China 
has destined 150 billion dollars per year to fight the pollution. In contrast, with 
just 1% of that quantity, they could fund scrubbers for its entire container fleet) 
(Wan et al., 2016.  
60 At the end of 2018 less than 1% of the global fleet invested in scrubbers; 
approximately 70% of those vessels operated in the ECAs (Halff et al., 2019).  
61 Other fuels that have been considered for this option have been LPG, DME/ 
Methanol, synthetic fuels and biofuels. Besides, it can be used nuclear energy 
too and, finally, renewable energy should not be dismissed. Even though this 
last option is still, in most cases, only a concept, renewable energy could work 
as a complement for other types of energy. Wind, solar and photovoltaics and 
biofuels are already in commercial use in some vessels (Mofor et al., 2015). 
62 Low Sulphur Fuel Oil, which means that its sulphur content is below 0.50%. 
Ultra-low sulphur fuel oil (ULSFO) also exists with a maximum sulphur content 
of 0.10%  
63 Due to COVID-19 crisis, there was a proposal to approve oil-production 
cuts. This triggered a breakup in the dialogues between Russia and the Orga-
nization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Russia left the agree-
ment and OPEC+ alliance (this expression is used to refer those countries which 
do not participle in the OPEC but have a relevant role in the crude commerce, 
such as Mexico or Kazakhstan). Besides, COVID-19 has provoked a huge fall of 
the transport and travel, with the correspondent drop of the crude use.  
64 This proportion is based on TCE (time-charter-equivalent) terms. This rate 
“is calculated by taking the spot rate in dollars per ton of cargo and converting 
it to dollars per day, subtracting voyage costs including fuel” (Miller, 2020). 
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380,65 (Fig. 3). VLSFO was around 300 $/t more expensive. Neverthe-
less, halfway through February, the difference between IFO 380 and 
VLSFO was 189.50 $/t. Additionally, on the 17th of June, this difference 
was only 67.50 $/t. At the beginning of 2020, it was expected that, 
approximately, 85% of the global container shipping fleet will change to 
the LSFO (Renshaw, 2020). 
For that reason, some shipping companies, such as Maersk,66 are 
innovating and creating their LSFO. Related to this option, some ship-
owners are trying another variation of the previous solution. They will 
continue using the HSFO but mixing it with other fuels with zero sulphur 
content (Li et al., 2020). 
Final and unfortunately, there is a choice of non-compliance. IMO 
cannot control and inspect every vessel. Neither do have port or flag 
states. It was probable to find some vessels not fulfilling IMO 2020 and, 
indeed, there have already been (Wainwright, 2020). 
5. The future: IMO 2030 
Shipping is considered the most carbon-efficient mode of transport 
although it concentrates around 80% of the transport of goods. How-
ever, it is still its major polluter. The Paris Agreement is an international 
convention to fight climate change. One of its main objectives is to 
maintain the increase of the global temperature well below 2 ◦C and to 
effort to limit that increase to 1.5 ◦C. A good method to achieve it is to 
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 
In the maritime sphere, the IMO began to discuss climate action in 
1997. In 2011, the IMO adopted the Energy Efficiency Design Index 
(EEDI) – which was mandatory for every new vessel – and the Ship 
Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) – for every ship –. Addi-
tionally, the IMO introduced some amendments to the Annex VI67 of the 
MARPOL Convention; for example, every vessel should keep onboard a 
ship-specific Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan (SEEMP) 
following the IMO's instructions. Some years later, in 2016, the IMO 
established a Data Collection System for fuel oil consumption of ships.68 
With this system, every vessel should report its fuel oil consumption. 
This information would be communicated to the flag state who would 
notify the IMO who would make an annual report. 
In 2014, the last IMO greenhouse gas emissions study (Smith et al., 
2014) revealed that the total shipping emissions were, approximately, 
938 million tonnes CO2 and 961 million tonnes CO2eq. Facing that, in 
2018 the IMO adopted an initial strategy for the reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions from vessels. Therefore, the IMO became the first inter-
national organization “to adopt mandatory energy-efficiency measures” 
(“UN body adopts climate change strategy for shipping,” 2018) that will 
affect an entire huge industry sector such as shipping69 (Fig. 4). 
Even though shipping is the most eco-friendly mode of transport, IMO 
pretend to turn it greener and cleaner. In 2008, the IMO approved some 
measures to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases under the Annex VI of 
IMO's pollution prevention treaty (MARPOL Convention). The second 
step of this strategy is the adoption of the “Initial IMO Strategy on the 
reduction of GHG emissions from ships”. Its purpose is to reduce the 
annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared to data from 
2008.70 Therefore, the first step is to control shipping emissions. Later, 
the next step will be controlling and reducing the shipping industry's 
total emissions by 2050. 
Nevertheless, IMO 2030 is still growing by leaps and bounds. IMO is 
contemplating some measures to achieve the 2030 objective such as 
regulations in the vessels' speed (MEPC 74/7/8), measures to improve 
the energetic efficiency in ships (MEPC 74/7/2) or the establishment of 
engine power limitations to improve vessels' energy efficiency (MEPC 
74/INF.23). For example, introducing engine power limitations of 40%– 
50% could reduce CO2 emissions, between 1% and 4%, depending on 
the vessel type and size (Rutherford et al., 2020). If the limitation of 
engine power were 60%, the reduction of CO2 in 2030 would be about 
6% in existing vessels. Naturally, this quantity would be higher if this 
measure would be adopted by every new vessel too (Rutherford et al., 
2020). One of the most specific documents with recommendations from 
IMO to adapt to its strategy IMO 2030 is MEPC.323(74). With this 
document, the International Maritime Organization invites the Member 
States to take regulatory, technical, operational and economic actions. 
Those include but are not limited to the provision of Onshore Power 
Supply, if possible, from renewable sources; safe and efficient bunkering 
of low-carbon and zero-carbon fuels; incentives of using those type of 
fuels; and support for the optimization of port calls. 
In 2023 it will take place the first review of this strategy. Therefore, 
experts will examine if IMO 2030 is a realistic measure such as IMO 
2020. 
6. Conclusions 
Maritime “environmental” salvage was the first strategy to fight 
marine pollution. Since its beginning in 1967, it has continued devel-
oping until the present days. Maritime salvage opened the door to 
maritime protection and, because of that, other strategies have been 
created to care about the marine environment. The latest strategy 
approved is IMO 2020, which focus on sulphur emissions. Its develop-
ment has not been exempted from criticism. Nevertheless, it has marked 
a milestone in the protection of the environment related to sulphur 
emissions. 
There should be taken into consideration that some exhaust gases 
will be discharged into the sea and not into the atmosphere; for example, 
if shipowners decide to use open-loop systems in the scrubbers. For that 
reason, IMO 2020 should not be the only strategy to protect the envi-
ronment from sulphur emissions. 
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Fig. 4. Shipping CO2 emissions compared to global CO2 emissions. Own elab-
oration by data provided from and the International Maritime Organization 
(Information provided by IMO is from its Third Greenhouse Gas Study in 2014. 
The fourth study was expected to be presented at the 76th meeting of the 
Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). However, due to COVID- 
19 this meeting was postposed and would probably take place in 2021.) and 
the International Council on Clean Transportation (Olmer et al., 2017; Smith 
et al., 2014). 
65 IFO 380 is one of the most commonly used types of heavy fuel oil produced 
by the distillation of crude oil. It is a type of LSFO.  
66 In 2019, Maersk announced that it was working with Koole Terminals to 
produce a 0.5% sulphur marine fuel. Its annual production was expected to 
cover 5–10% of Maersk's annual demand Maersk and Koole Terminals to pro-
duce 0.5% sulphur marine fuel in Rotterdam [WWW Document], 2019 to 
produce 0.5% sulphur marine fuel in Rotterdam,” 2019).  
67 Resolution MEPC.203(62).  
68 Resolution MEPC.278(70).  
69 GHGs combining CO2, CH4 and N2O.  
70 (RESOLUTION MEPC.304(72). 
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sphere has demonstrated that cares about the environment. Especially in 
Maritime law, different actors and not only governments have made this 
possible. Insurances, salvors, lobbies, NGOs, P&I Clubs, shipowners, etc. 
have collaborated for decades to prevent maritime pollution. And their 
journey does not end with IMO 2020. Greenhouse gases have not been 
forgotten. Thus, IMO 2020 is not the only strategy designed by this in-
ternational organization to protect the air environment. IMO 2030 and, 
eventually, IMO 2050, would be implemented to control GHG emissions. 
IMO 2030 and IMO 2050 may be ambitious, but necessary to care about 
our sea. 
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